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value,	including	what	should	be	included	in	a	political	constitution,	through	experience	of	the	facts	and	through	processes	of	political	struggle.			 Thorough	defense	of	these	claims	would	require	another	paper,	so,	for	this	chapter,	what	must	suffice	is	an	explanation	of	how	the	link	of	central	capabilities	to	constitutions	might	be	effectively	replaced	with	an	account	that	refers	instead	to	important	capabilities	(that	is,	evolving,	non-essential	ones).	Some	cases	regarding	the	creation	and	alteration	of	constitutions	are	included	to	indicate	that	these	concerns	are	not	merely	abstract.			 I	begin	from	the	assumption	that	a	national	constitution	need	not	enumerate	all	central	or	important	capabilities	that	are	necessary	for	the	well-being	of	the	people:	neither	all	of	Nussbaum’s	central	capabilities,	nor	all	of	what	I	call	important	capabilities	that	are	appropriate	for	a	given	time,	need	be	treated	in	legal	rights.	Instead,	as	other	philosophers	have	suggested,	“specific	human	rights	respond	to	familiar	and	recurrent	threats	to	fundamental	human	interests”	(Nickel	2007,	3);	similarly,	rights	may	also	include	commitments	to	accessible	opportunities	for	advancement	of	human	flourishing,	as	is	the	case,	for	example,	in	the	right	to	education.	What	has	frequently	found	its	way	into	constitutions	in	the	past	and	what	belongs	within	planning	for	a	new	constitution,	I	suggest,	is	language	that	addresses	familiar	recurrent	threats	and	accessible	opportunities.		 Threats	are	addressed	through	rights,	but	new	threats	arise	under	particular	historical	conditions	and	old	ones	depart.	A	new	constitution	should	reflect	its	era	and	an	old	one	should	be	rewritten,	or	should	track	history	through	amendments.	For	an	example	of	a	new	threat,	the	legal	right	to	privacy	appears	to	be	a	recent	and	developing	innovation	in	response	to	such	threat	(Clapham	2016,	113-20).	The	suggestion	that	a	state	should	ensure	“provisions	for	a	zone	of	personal	privacy”	(Nussbaum	2011,	40)	may	be	one	that	is	appropriate	in	some	historical	conditions—from	the	era	of	ubiquity	for	printing	presses	and	up	to	present	–	and	not	in	others.	This	is	not	to	say	that	abuse	of	privacy	is	acceptable	in	other	circumstances;	rather,	there	may	be	circumstances	in	which	a	government	cannot	or	need	not	play	the	role	of	guarantor,	since,	once	again,	“specific	human	rights	
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respond	to	familiar	and	recurrent	threats	to	fundamental	human	interests.”	New	important	capabilities	will	also	come	into	being	in	future.	For	example,	no	capability	for	access	to	the	internet	existed	before	the	latter	half	of	the	20th	Century,	and	the	capability	did	not	become	an	important	one,	in	the	sense	intended	here,	before	perhaps	the	21st	Century.	That	capability	may	now	rate	as	important,	as	emerging	international	and	national	norms	suggest	(UN	2003;	UN	2015,	9.c;	Ecuador	2008,	Article	16.2).			 Among	currently	accessible	opportunities	is	“an	adequate	education,	including,	but	by	no	means	limited	to,	literacy	and	basic	mathematical	and	scientific	training.”	(Nussbaum	2011,	33)	Education	is	thus	incorporated	under	Nussbaum’s	fourth	central	capability,	“Being	able	to	use	the	senses,	to	imagine,	think	and	reason.”	Education	was	framed	as	a	responsibility	of	the	state	by	Aristotle,	as	Nussbaum	notes	(Nussbaum	1987,	21),	but	it	has	only	recently	been	treated	as	a	guarantee	for	all	people,	since	such	education	is	made	possible	in	certain	economic	and	social	conditions	that	have	only	recently	arrived.	A	right	to	universal	education	probably	could	not	have	been	supported	as	a	state	responsibility	before	the	Twentieth	Century,	except	in	a	very	limited	number	of	cases.	For	perspective	on	this	choice	of	date,	consider	national	and	global	advances	in	popular	education.	England,	which	was	a	European	leader	alongside	Netherlands,	achieved	50%	literacy	for	men	about	1650,	and	the	same	for	women	about	1850	(Clark,	179).	Over	the	century	leading	up	to	1900	the	world	literacy	rate	is	estimated	to	have	about	doubled,	reaching	21%.	State	guarantees	demand	particular	social	conditions,	such	as	a	sufficiency	of	literate	people	to	both	run	the	state	and	provide	universal	education.	Though	Cuba’s	1961	literacy	campaign	provides	a	shining	example	of	rapid	improvement	as	Cuba	increased	its	literacy	to	beyond	96%	in	just	nine	months,	it	began	its	campaign	with	an	85%	literacy	rate,	according	to	one	of	the	program’s	architects	(Prieto	1981,	221).	Consider	India’s	case:	efforts	at	establishing	a	right	to	education	date	at	least	from	1910,	but	the	right	to	education	only	came	to	be	recognized	in	India’s	courts	more	than	80	years	later,	and	the	clause	“the	State	shall	provide	free	and	compulsory	education”	was	inserted	into	India’s	Constitution	as	
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article	21a	in	2002	(Selva	2009).	The	ideal	of	a	right	to	education	was	expressed	as	Article	26	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	in	1948,	so	it	appears	that	it	was	available	at	the	drafting	of	India’s	Constitution	in	1950,	but	was	set	aside.	Though	capabilities	refer	to	what	people	deserve,	constitutions	refer	to	what	states	can	deliver,	and	they	should	reflect	the	maximum	of	important	capabilities	states	can	be	expected	deliver	(see	also,	Crocker	2008,	205).	Constitutions	might	sensibly	be	limited	to	justiciable	guarantees,	or	might	add	directive	principles	for	courts	(McLean	2009,	7-14),	or	further	add	directive	principles	for	policy,	as	India	did	for	education	in	1950,	leaving	further	aspiration	aside	(India,	39,	41).		 The	above	sketch	indicates	how	a	changing	set	of	important	capabilities	might	take	the	place	of	central	capabilities	and	how	constitutions	may	be	limited	to	contain	less	than	a	full	set	of	important	capabilities.	A	greater	concern	for	approaching	a	constitution	with	a	list	in	hand	is	that	philosophers	–	and	representatives,	too	–	may	not	be	in	a	position	to	identify	rights	that	are	important	to	members	of	groups	to	which	they	do	not	belong.	I	have	in	mind	political	struggles	in	which	individuals	come	to	understand	their	group	identity	through	struggle.	Before	they	have	self-identified	as	a	group,	the	individuals	may	experience	their	social	exclusion	as	dysphoria,	or	they	may	adapt	their	preferences	instead	of	grasping	that	a	lack	of	appropriate	entitlements	is	the	source	of	their	malaise,	and	they	may	not	be	capable	of	identifying	or	articulating	their	demands	for	rights	until	the	political	process	is	under	way.	A	well-documented	case	of	such	dialectical	development	is	the	homophile	movement	of	USA,	a	political	effort	that	played	out	from	the	1940’s	up	to	the	period	of	gay	activism	starting	with	the	1969	Stonewall	riots	(Faderman	2015,	53-113).	In	such	a	situation,	I	think,	both	political	representatives	and	thoughtful	philosophers	may	fail	to	identify	the	concern,	or	might	identify	the	concern	as	pathological.	That	is	to	say:	a	list	might	be	of	no	help,	or	might	be	routinely	interpreted	by	philosophers	and	representatives	in	ways	that	obscure	others’	concerns,	dissipating	class	consciousness.	
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	 For	a	constitutional	case,	consider	Ecuador’s	national	interpretation	of	the	“Rights	of	the	good	way	of	living	(buen	vivir)”	articulated	within	its	recently	adopted	Constitution	(Ecuador	2008,	Preamble).	Ecuador	also	frames	this	conception	as	“sumak	kawsay,”	a	Kichwa	dialect	term.	Eduardo	Gudynas	characterizes	sumak	
kawsay	as	“fullness	of	life	in	a	community	together	with	other	persons	and	Nature,”	in	which	“Nature	becomes	a	subject;	human	beings	as	the	only	source	of	values	are	therefore	displaced.”	(442,	445)	As	sumak	kawsay	is	articulated	in	the	constitution,	it	entails	“rights	of	nature,”	including	“the	right	to	integral	respect	for	its	existence	and	for	the	maintenance	and	regeneration	of	its	life	cycles,	structure,	functions	and	evolutionary	processes.”	Nature	also	has	a	“right	to	be	restored”	(Ecuador,	Articles	71,	72,	83).	Each	person	has	rights	to	live	“in	harmony	with	nature”	and	has	attendant	individual	duties	to	“respect	the	rights	of	nature,	preserve	a	healthy	environment	and	use	natural	resources	rationally,	sustainably	and	durably	...	in	harmonious	coexistence	with	nature.”	(27,	83;	see	also	275)		 This	matrix	of	rights	and	responsibilities	may	suggest	that	Ecuador’s	Constitution	supports	a	central	capability	that	Nussbaum	characterizes	as	“being	able	to	live	with	concern	for	and	in	relation	to	animals,	plants,	and	the	world	of	nature”	(2011,	34).	But	the	rights	of	nature	and	the	correlate	of	an	individual’s	responsibility	toward	nature	that	are	called	for	in	the	constitution	suggest	that	a	very	different	claim	is	contained	in	this	ideal	of	living	harmoniously	with	nature.	Indeed,	this	ideal	may	not	be	compatible	with	the	liberal	conception	of	the	individual,	since	Kichwa	political	activists	have	explicitly	identified	it	as	a	genuine	departure	from	liberal	conceptions	of	individual	rights	and	of	individualism	(Becker	2011,	48,	51).	Nussbaum	may	have	conceptions	of	buen	vivir	and	deep	ecology	in	mind	in	Creating	Capabilities	as	she	notes	a	“basic	position”	concerning	“animal	entitlements”	to	which	she	does	not	subscribe,	in	which	“Individualism	[of	all	living	organisms]	is	dropped	[and]	the	capabilities	of	systems	(ecosystems	in	particular,	but	also	species)	count	as	ends	in	themselves.”	(158)	Nussbaum	admits	that	she	cannot	yet	make	sense	of	the	position	and	then	she	concludes	“[t]hat	animals	can	suffer	not	just	pain	but	also	injustice	seems,	however,	secure.”	(159)	This	is	a	
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fallback	to	individualism	that	the	Kichwa	activists	would	appear	not	to	find	satisfactory.	So,	I	expect	sumak	kawsay	simply	does	not	fit	within	Nussbaum’s	list.	That	it	is	not	on	the	list	and	does	not	fit	the	list	should	not	be	taken	to	suggest	that	it	is	not	a	capability	that	is	important	in	the	sense	indicated	in	this	chapter.	Indigenous	activists	have	argued	that	sumak	kawsay	is	central	to	their	concept	of	well-being	and	they	credit	its	establishment	in	the	constitution	to	“decades	of	resistance	and	social	movements,	the	indigenous	movement,	and	diverse	sectors	of	the	Ecuadorian	peoples.”	(Becker	2011,	59)		 Debate	has	also	arisen	as	to	the	meaning	of	sumak	kawsay.	Despite	its	presence	in	the	constitution,	the	understanding	of	many	of	those	engaged	in	drafting	the	document	may	have	diverged	greatly	from	the	understanding	of	people	who	received	the	concept	within	its	original	cultural	context.	One	development	expert	and	government	official,	René	Ramírez	Gallegos,	sees	a	close	connection	of	sumak	
kawsay	to	Aristotelian	thought	(Ramírez	2010,	8,	49).	European	academics	Laura	Portela	and	Carmen	Ayerra	have	taken	sumak	kawsay	to	“very	loosely”	approximate	the	concept	of	capability,	but	find	the	concept	of	“ecodependence”	a	better	fit	(Portela	&	Ayerra	2013,	159).	Ecuadorian	philosopher	David	Cortez	cites	native	Kichwa	anthropologist	Carlos	Viteri	Gualinga	to	argue	that	the	constitution’s	treatment	of	sumak	kawsay	as	one	approach	to	buen	vivir	reduces	the	former,	yielding	a	conflation	of	“being	with	Mother	Nature”	and	“conditions	for	social	welfare”	(Cortez	2014,	321;	see	also	Tibán	2000).	Cortez	finds	improvement	upon	“economic	liberalism”	in	the	importance	Nussbaum	gives	to	nature	(326);	nevertheless	he	finds	that	Nussbaum	cleaves	to	“a	western	anthropocentric	system”	and	he	concludes:	the	notion	of	“human	development”	in	the	approach	to	good	living	in	the	[Ecuador]	National	Development	Plans	and	similar	concepts	such	as	"capabilities"	and	"quality	of	life"	found	in	the	readings	of	Amartya	Sen	and	Martha	Nussbaum	reproduce	an	economic	and	political	narrative	that	is	incompatible	with	the	perspective	of	sumak	kawsay,	which	has	lately	emerged	as	a	critique	of	liberal	paradigms.	(326,	337)			 I	do	not	wish	to	suggest	that	the	introduction	of	a	list	of	central	capabilities	such	as	Nussbaum’s	has	in	fact	been	deleterious	to	the	drafting	of	Ecuador’s	
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constitution,	or	to	the	introduction	of	sumak	kawsay	into	its	text.	But	the	turns	of	critical	dialogue	noted	above	suggest	that	a	misunderstanding	has	arisen.	The	familiar	language	of	development	economics,	liberalism	and	capabilities	may	cant	understanding,	where	such	language	frames	discussion.	So	philosophers,	government	officials	and	representatives	with	backgrounds	dissimilar	to	others	within	the	community	may	present	a	“thick,	vague	theory	of	the	good”	that	leaves	too	thin	a	space	for	public	reason,	and	so,	may	obscure	alternatives.	At	the	least,	such	initial	offering	of	language	will	produce	much	greater	demands	upon	those	who	might	hope	to	express	very	different	views	and	values	in	diverse	languages.	If	the	public	forum	is	not	sufficiently	open	then	there	are	hazards	even	in	the	proposal	that	we	view	Nussbaum’s	list	“as	a	stimulus	for	public	debate	in	the	construction,	interpretation,	and	application	of	constitutional	principles.”	(Crocker	2008,	198)		
Conclusion	I	have	argued	that	just	politics	and	politics	in	the	context	of	development	diverge	from	liberal	assumptions	concerning	the	role	that	the	individual	takes	in	conceiving	value.	The	liberal	tradition	slights	the	social,	or	the	relational,	in	its	characterization	of	the	political	subject	within	its	theories	of	justice.	Feminist	relational	theorists	present	a	challenge	to	that	tradition	by	introducing	relational	autonomy	to	supplant	the	liberal	conception	of	individual	autonomy.	Goulet’s	theory	of	development	also	challenges	individualism	as	it	suggests	the	plausible	hypothesis	that	value	is	produced	dialectically	through	social	interaction.		 This	suggests	that	politics	and	development	are	human	and	social:	they	involve	the	creation	of	value	as	a	dialectical	product	of	dependent,	biological	creatures.	That	claim	is	one	made	within	axiology,	theory	of	value,	or	normativity;	it	is	not	a	claim	within	ethics.	Within	ethics,	such	understanding	of	value	underwrites	further	characterization	of	what	we	should	value	to	live	well.	If	value	is	produced	through	social	processes,	then	those	processes	are	also	the	subject	matter	of	ethical	theory.	And	this	concern	finally	reaches	to	development	ethics:	if	the	individual	as	
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political	subject	is	constituted	in	this	way,	and	if	values	are	created	in	this	way,	then	we	can	find	new	reasons	as	to	why	democratic	participation	may	foster	development	and	may	be	the	ethical	choice	for	development	as	well.9		
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